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Labor Law for Whom? Interest Group Politics and the Wagner Act
The era of the Great Depression and President Roosevelt’s ensuing New Deal is a subject
of history that has fascinated scholars and the American public alike. During this time, several
important pieces of legislation as well as new federal programs and agencies that were
designed to aid in the restoration of the economy were developed. These major changes broke
with recent American political history and resulted in an unprecedented expansion of state
power. Both the skillful leadership of President Roosevelt and the dominance of the Democrats
after their landslide victory in 1934 are often focused on for their roles in the political shift. Yet
closer examination proves that their leadership and the resulting changes were very
complicated. There were deep divisions within the Democratic Party, namely amongst Southern
Democrats and progressive urban liberals. President Roosevelt’s goals sometimes competed
with the goals of the various congressional factions. This friction reflects the unique way the
American political system is structured. Policies are carefully constructed through a democratic
bargaining process during which politicians work to represent the often conflicting interests of
those who elected them. The focus of this essay will be on one such case that illustrates the
complexity of policy making during the New Deal which is the Wagner Act, formally known as
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935.
The Wagner Act has been a controversial piece of legislation since its inception and
remains so today. It is tied to both the legal legitimization of unions as well as the eventual
decline of union membership. Regardless of its merits, the fact that such a radical piece of
legislation was successfully passed and institutionalized during the tumultuous 1930s proves to
be an interesting subject of study.
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This leads to the question this essay will explore: how was the Wagner Act passed and
which forces were instrumental in its development? Marc Landy credits President Roosevelt
with successfully “enlarging the party without dividing it” which resulted in the remarkable New
Deal coalition that for the most part dominated politics through the 1960s (74-75). Theda
Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold also assign a prominent role to the electoral shift that occurred
in 1934 (1300). But rather than focusing on the party-building activities of President Roosevelt,
they emphasize the leadership of ambitious political reformers such as Senator Robert Wagner
and his allies (1300). In contrast, Michael Goldfield sees the Wagner Act as a political response
to an increasingly militant labor upsurge that was developing at the time (1258). Other
important pieces in the scholarly debate have emphasized the constraints capitalism imposes
on policy-making as well as the influence of business elites. This essay aims to highlight the
complex ways in which different interest groups and politicians bargained and interacted,
ultimately culminating in the Wagner Act of 1935.
To begin, it will be helpful to start with a brief historical review of the years preceding
1935. The elements that strengthened the need for federal labor legislation will be highlighted.
Next, the Wagner Act will be explained, taking care to note some important exclusions that
were written into the law. Having reviewed the historical context and the form the Wagner Act
eventually took, I will then return to the question of how the act was passed and which
influences were the most instrumental in its development. To do this, several important pieces
in the scholarly debate over this issue will be reviewed. A careful synthesis of these viewpoints
will help to develop my own argument and conclusion.
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THE NIRA & THE WAGNER ACT
In the early 1930s most Americans had become disillusioned with the Republican Party and
were ready for change. Political reformers in the Democratic Party were eager to take on the
task. Franklin Delano Roosevelt defeated incumbent President Herbert Hoover in 1932 and
became the 37th President of the United States. Shortly thereafter, the Democrats took control
of both the House and the Senate. The New Deal is often divided into two periods, the “First
New Deal” lasting from 1933-1934 and the “Second New Deal” lasting from 1935-1938 (Milkis
41). The First New Deal encompassed a series of policies aimed at reviving banks and stabilizing
the economy, and interestingly, President Roosevelt’s goals during this time were
fundamentally conservative (Rauchway 59). The policies implemented during the Second New
Deal were far more progressive, and it was during this time that the Wagner Act was devised
(Milkis 41).
In 1933 as part of the “First New Deal”, President Roosevelt signed the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) into law. The NIRA was designed to manage industry through the
creation of codes that would fix prices and allow businesses to compete on even grounds
(Rauchway 83). It established the National Recovery Administration (NRA) to oversee
implementation (83). The NIRA also included a section, 7(a), which guaranteed that “employees
shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor,
or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization” (83).
Employers begrudgingly accepted section 7(a) as a necessary concession in order to obtain the
benefits of codes and exemption from anti-trust laws that NIRA provided (83).
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The implementation of the NIRA was rocky. Industries desired the stabilization that the
NIRA promised, but at the same time wanted to maintain their own authority (Skocpol and
Finegold, “State Capacity” 266). Through collaboration with the NRB, industry leaders worked
to manipulate the codes to their own advantage by including loopholes that allowed them to
overstep labor provisions and by raising prices to high and uncompetitive levels (265). The
codes were disorganized, jurisdictions often overlapped, and the desire to manipulate codes to
achieve a competitive advantage quickly intensified business feuds (266). Not long after
implementation, business had become disillusioned with the NIRA and opposition toward the
Democrats grew (267).
At the same time, interesting things were happening within the labor movement. The
NIRA had legitimized workers’ grievances (Piven 110). Included in the NIRA as a reassurance to
labor, not to “foment discord” as President Roosevelt had explained, section 7(a) had the
opposite result and effectively encouraged people to unionize (111). The perception of
government support for unionization revitalized the labor movement. The government had
now asserted collective bargaining and fair treatment as a right. However, workers quickly
learned that this new right would not be enforced. Businesses still threatened workers,
replaced those who caused trouble, and stalled any attempts by the NRA at reconciliation
(120). In 1934, the NIRA took another blow which would prove to be fatal. In Schechter v.
United States the Supreme Court ruled the NRA to be unconstitutional on the basis that it “too
broadly interpreted Congress’s constitutional ability to regulate interstate commerce”
(Rauchway 108). This incensed President Roosevelt as he felt that the Supreme Court decision
“rendered the federal government impotent” in a time when the country was increasingly
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reliant on interstate commerce (108). The failure of the NIRA marked the beginning of a turning
point in President Roosevelt’s stance on labor.
From the beginning of his presidency, Roosevelt’s relatively conservative ideology along
with business pressure had led him to fail to actively support labor legislation and even
sometimes proactively work against labor-friendly policies (Piven 132). Roosevelt had preferred
only regulations that addressed wages, hours, and working conditions (Skocpol 179). His aim
had been to delicately balance the pressures of labor and capital (179). Yet in the wake of the
adverse ruling of the Supreme Court, Roosevelt changed his outlook and grew warmer to the
idea of new labor legislation. Several factors were at play that may have pushed Roosevelt to
the left: business opposition was at an all-time high, the labor movement had grown to the
extent it could no longer be ignored, and the 1936 presidential election was approaching (Piven
131). With both the Supreme Court and business turned against him, labor support suddenly
became all-the-more valuable (131). It was apparent to Roosevelt that he needed to take action
on behalf of labor, but even so his turnaround took time. Roosevelt only lent support to the
Wagner Act after it was clearly apparent it had strong political support by passing in both the
House and the Senate (132).
The National Labor Relations Act was signed into law by President Roosevelt on July 5,
1935. It was designed to strengthen labor as a countervailing force against business (Rauchway
97). Specifically, the NLRA asserted that “The denial by some employers of the right of
employees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest” and therefore to
preserve the free flow of commerce it encouraged “the practice and procedure of collective
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bargaining” and provided protection for workers’ rights to “freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.”
As a means of enforcement, the Wagner Act reestablished the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) and granted it the legal authority to oversee collective bargaining, investigate
allegations of unfair labor practices and provide hearings, and to direct union elections to
certify union representatives (Skocpol 159). These protections were important for labor, but
interestingly enough the Wagner Act also excluded several groups.
Groups excluded under the National Labor Relations Act included government
employees, employees who were covered under the Railway Labor Act, supervisors, and
agricultural and domestic workers. It also allowed those who had religious convictions against
unions an exemption so that they were not required to join or financially support them. Being
that white southerners were a large constituency during the 1930s, the exemptions found in
the Wagner Act were likely drafted according to their preferences. Overall, the South had
supported the New Deal due to the need for federal dollars and development (Rauchway 89).
But because of underlying racial tensions and the fact that the Southern economy was focused
in labor-intensive industries, Southern capitalists deeply opposed labor unions (108). The
exemption of domestic and agricultural workers, (many of whom were African Americans),
prevented large groups of people in the South from becoming eligible to unionize (100). The
ways in which Southern elites and other interests were able to influence politicians will be
discussed in more detail in the sections that follow.
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COMPETING INTERESTS DURING THE NEW DEAL
As illustrated in the preceding review of the NIRA and the Wagner Act, there were many
stakeholders invested in influencing the outcome of labor reform. This essay will separate
stakeholders into three major groups: political reformers, the labor movement, and business
elites. Each of these groups had goals to shape labor reform in ways that they deemed
satisfactory. As this essay will illustrate, sometimes conflicting interests within groups caused
internal struggles. And at times, coalitions were formed amongst the groups, but the degree to
which coalitions existed, or mattered, varies in the opinions of scholars.

Political Reformers. Several scholarly theories about the Wagner Act focus on the leadership of
political reformers, such as Senator Robert Wagner. A labor-friendly politician from New York,
Wagner was known to be “unusually effective in piloting bills through the Senate” (Skocpol
180). During his time as a senator in the 1920s, “he was one of the first congressman to build an
independent staff and to employ and consult professional experts in drafting legislature” (180).
In 1933 he was appointed by President Roosevelt to be chairman of the National Labor Board
(NLB) which was responsible for enforcing the labor protections specified under section 7a of
the NIRA (167). As he witnessed employers refusing to honor NLB decisions, Senator Wagner
became hardened against the strategy of “friendly persuasion” and determined that an
expansion of federal power would be necessary to enforce the rights of workers (167).
In her 1980 article Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the
State and the Case of the New Deal, Theda Skocpol works to discredit earlier theories that
“treat political outcomes . . . as the enactments of a far-sighted capitalist ruling class or as the
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automatically functional responses of the political system to the needs of capitalism” (199). She
argues that these Neo-Marxist theories do not afford “sufficient weight to state and party
organizations as independent determinants of political conflicts and outcomes” (199). Instead,
Skocpol attributes the Wagner Act to being an “autonomous political effort, spearheaded by
Wagner, to array state power against capitalist prerogatives and preferences” (180).
Elaborating on this line of logic, Skocpol collaborated with Kenneth Finegold to argue
against the assertion that the Wagner Act was the result of a growing labor upsurge. Skocpol
and Finegold argue that strike volume declined between 1934 and 1935, so the Wagner Act
would not have been developed in response to a labor movement that was actually diminishing
(“Explaining New Deal” 1300). They reason that the Wagner Act passed because of two major
changes during this time period: the 1934 elections were swept by liberal Democrats, and the
NIRA was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court (1300). The failure of the NIRA
provided an opportunity for Wagner and the board that drafted the NLRA to present it as “a
good way to promote both economic recovery and to put labor relations on a new footing”
(1301). In other words, the defeat of the NIRA made evident the need for expanded state
power and the ability to federally enforce legislation (1301). Senator Wagner and other
progressive reformers were “seeking to expand the labor movement, not to ‘constrain and
limit’ labor to the established unions of 1935” (1299).
David Plotke also exposes several potential failures of logic in common theories about
the origins of the Wagner Act, beginning with the onslaught of the Depression. While the
economic crisis certainly provided a sense of urgency for new legislation to be passed, Plotke
argues that politicians were not so constrained by the crisis that the Wagner Act was their only
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option (112). This counters Neo-Marxist views that see the Wagner Act as an inevitable policy
choice made by politicians who were responding to capitalist elites (112).
Plotke believes that some theories give too much weight to the impact of both
capitalists and labor. He argues that the act could not be seen as the result of efforts by
capitalists to “reorder labor relations” because there were deep divisions amongst capitalists
that would have prevented a consensus from being formed (115). Nor was the Wagner Act a
result of the labor movement because although labor representatives were consulted during its
drafting, they lacked direct political power and were not responsible for the ultimate form the
act took (115).
He also rejects the pluralist viewpoint that the Wagner Act was a compromise between
capital and labor because he believes there was no need for a political tug-of-war; most of the
capitalist class firmly opposed the Wagner Act and labor was too weak to be given a causal role
(135). Instead, Plotke finds merit in another variation of the political reformer theory that
focuses on the role of Progressive liberals and acknowledges the fledgling, but growing, power
of the labor movement.
Plotke argues that the Wagner Act should be seen as a “process of political reform, led
by Progressive liberals in coalition with the labor movement” (135). A coalition was necessary
because the Democrats were divided on the issue of labor (137). Many believed that some form
of labor legislation was necessary, although others did not see labor law as a priority (137). Of
those that were open to reform, their ideas were often much less labor-friendly than the
ensuing Wagner Act (137).
Progressives, as a distinct group within the Democratic Party, were the leaders in this
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reform effort (137). Their dominant trait was their commitment to a new vision of the role of
government. Their activities ultimately expanded state power, but that was not their main goal
(152). Instead, Progressives envisioned a more balanced and fairly organized society, and to
accomplish this the state needed to pursue active regulations of society and the market (123).
In order to achieve this, they needed the power a coalition would provide (117).
Progressives entered into a mutually beneficial coalition with labor. In doing so, they
achieved the kind of political dominance they needed to pass the Wagner Act (123). And as
state capacity expanded, the labor movement was itself “constructed as a powerful political
force” (156).
It is clear that political reformers such as Robert Wagner were the ones directly
responsible for the Wagner Act. The fact that the act was successfully passed despite
opposition from the Roosevelt administration and capitalist ranks is no small feat. Wagner and
the Progressive liberals in his coalition deserve credit for their political skill. Without the
longstanding determination and persuasive ability of political reformers, the Wagner Act would
not have been possible. However, a major reason political reformers were so successful was
because of their astute recognition of the value of labor as an ally. Their ability to harness the
power of the labor movement should not be ignored.

The Labor Movement. It is well known that the 1930s were years ripe with social unrest and
labor upheaval. Proponents of theories that rest on the autonomy of state actors don’t find
enough evidence to assign the labor movement a causal role in the passage of the Wagner Act.
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But another school of thought has argued that these movements were important because they
created a social emergency of sorts that provided politicians with a legitimate reason to act.
Michael Goldfield argues that the strongest force behind the passage of the Wagner Act
was a growing labor militancy that was becoming increasingly organized by radicals (1277).
During the early 1930s, several groups including the unemployed, farmers, students and
intellectuals, and African-American industrial workers began protesting (1272). Communists
were quick to capitalize on the power potential of this large group of people by organizing them
(1269). The pre-existing Communist networks facilitated the growth and organization of the
labor upsurge (1272). Communists did not shy from violence and brought a radical dimension to
protests (1272). Both politicians and employers were eager to neutralize this threat, and
determined that the “best way to preserve order, prevent high levels of strike activity, slow the
spread of communism, and diffuse serious challenges to the capitalist system was by creating a
government-supported legal environment where moderate forces . . . were protected and not
so disadvantaged (1276).”
Goldfield argues that union membership rose by 20 percent in 1934 directly prior to the
passage of the Wagner Act (1272). This increase in organization, (led and accompanied by
radicals), combined with the electoral shift and provided political reformers with the strength
and influence they needed to pass the Wagner Act (1277-8). Without the influence of social
unrest and the radical aspect of the labor upsurge, it is unlikely that political reformers would
have come together with enough power to pass the Wagner Act (1278).
Francis Fox Piven also finds the influence of the social and labor movements to be
important, but in contrast with Goldfield, he finds the spontaneous and unorganized manner in
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which the early movements occurred to be the premise of their power (xxiii). Piven argues that
the labor movement was most influential before it became organized (96). This is because the
power behind the labor movement was directly correlated with its ability to disrupt the
economy through strikes (96). As unionization spread and labor became more organized, its
most effective weapon diminished (96).
Piven explains that workers were initially quiet during the early years of the Depression
(108). A major cornerstone of the American identity was a strong work ethic and independence.
Workers initially blamed themselves for their struggle and were reluctant to accept state
assistance (108). As the Depression worsened, the grievances of those who were still employed
grew stronger, but mostly in private (108). The impetus for them to unite was the passage of
NIRA; as Piven explains, “that the federal government had made promises at such a time gave a
new spirit and righteousness, and a new direction, to the struggles of unorganized workers”
(110).
As workers gravitated in the masses to become unionized, unions divided them through
attempts at organization (116). Members of federal locals “would ultimately be divided up
among the craft unions who staked out their jurisdictional claims, sometimes splitting newly
organized workers in a factory among as many as fifteen or twenty unions” (116). At first the
division of the labor movement through organization did not appear to have a major impact.
Piven cites that there were three times as many workers striking in 1933 after the passage of
NIRA than in 1932. Notably, although the federal government was mostly concerned with
pacifying business demands at this point, a new level of restraint was being exercised in the
treatment of labor (128). The Roosevelt administration quietly attempted to at least
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acknowledge labor’s demands, which was a break from the earlier tactics of sending in federal
troops to break up strikes (128).
Ultimately, the Wagner Act was passed due in part to the disruption the labor
movement had caused (132). Piven explains that labor militancy surged in 1936 and 1937 after
the passage of the NLRA (133). He concludes that the government was just as responsible as
unions were for the organization of workers (147). Ultimately, in Piven’s view, unions were not
the force responsible for making the government act (147). That power resided within the ranks
of the ordinary, unorganized workers and their ability to disrupt the economy and threaten
social order through their use of the strike (148).
Views that stress the influence of social and labor movements are helpful because they
recognize a major source of political pressure that politicians were responding to during the
New Deal. As pointed out earlier, they may fail to allocate enough autonomy to political
reformers who had their own personal goals to create lasting reform. These movements also
put pressure on capitalists and perhaps moved them slightly to the left, or at the very least
increased business anxieties which contributed to spreading disarray. The remainder of this
literature review will examine what business-focused theories add to the discussion.

Business Elites. Theories regarding the power of business elites and the methods through which
they influence policy are perhaps the most complex. In a capitalist society such as the United
States, businesses are essential to the health of the economy. Some argue that this constrains
the policy-making choices available to politicians. Others claim this is incorrect as they point to
instances, such as the Wagner Act, where policies were implemented despite strong business
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opposition. This section will explore the unique political position business elites enjoy, as well
as the different ways capitalists are able to influence policy.
At the most fundamental level, voters are the basis of democracy. They vote to elect
politicians, who then work to represent the interests and goals of those who elected them.
However, it is also possible to examine the workings of democracy by looking beyond voters.
Thomas Ferguson argues that investors, not voters, are the fundamental constituency for
politicians (37). To become an educated voter means to invest a significant amount of time into
acquiring, understanding, and acting upon political issues (25). Ferguson argues that businesses,
due to economies of scale, are better equipped to burden the costs associated with political
information gathering and participation (30). Additionally, businesses hold a great stake in
policy outcomes because they can affect their profitability (22). Ferguson’s “investment theory
of parties holds that parties are more accurately analyzed as blocs of major investors who
coalesce to advance candidates representing their interests” (27). This can be done by lobbying,
coordinating campaign efforts, and paying for expensive media advertising (28). Because of the
privileged position capital holds in the political sphere, “elections become contests between
several oligarchic parties, whose major public policy proposals reflect the interests of large
investors, and which minor investor-voters are virtually incapable of affecting” (28).
This view raises important questions in the context of the Wagner Act and the New
Deal. Was it possible for “minor investor-voters” to assemble enough power to effectively
influence the legislative discussion in a meaningful way? If not, and powerful business elites
were driving the legislative debates, which industries made up these investor blocs and what

Jorgenson 16
were their goals? Further examination of Ferguson’s arguments as well as review of additional
scholarly literature will help answer these questions.
Ferguson contends that voters are able to overcome their constraints and influence
public policy, though their ability to do this varies in strength over time (87). In order to do so,
voters must have available to them a robust “secondary network” of organizations that allow
them to spread information costs and concentrate political efforts (29). During the New Deal,
organized labor facilitated the growth of a strong political voice for a large group of otherwise
ordinary voters (82). In the case of the Wagner Act, the organization of labor created a unified
labor vote that possessed a new strength (124). Labor then partnered with a segment of capital,
which further enhanced the voice of both parties (82).
Why would any segment of capital wish to enter into a coalition with labor?
Categorizing businesses into different groups aids in the understanding of their unique goals.
Ferguson separates firms into two groups: “internationalist” and “nationalist” (123).
Internationalist firms are generally capital-intensive and stand to benefit from less government
regulation and free trade (123). In contrast, nationalist firms are generally labor-intensive and
favor state intervention to protect them from foreign competition (123). During the mid-1930s
internationalist firms had more to gain from lowered tariffs and greater friendliness to trade
the New Dealers were promoting in other areas than they had to lose from labor reform (152).
In turn, internationalist firms allied with labor to become the dominant bloc of political
investors (82).
Peter Swenson also focuses on capitalist influence, but in a more indirect manner. He
finds that capitalists send signals to politicians that allow them to gauge the potential for future
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support or opposition to reform policies (69). His argument rests on the angles of “historical
learning” and “strategic anticipation” of capitalist reactions to policy reform (69). During the
New Deal, politicians aimed to develop lasting legislation that would be secure against any
future attacks from capitalists once “the social emergency and electoral mobilization of
supportive populist pressures” passed (68). In order to do this, they made decisions based on
learned political experiences from the past and evaluated the prospects for future attacks or
support for their legislation (68). In order to ensure longevity for the Wagner Act, they
strategically developed it in a way that would allow for a “post-facto cross-class alliance” with
business (68).
The combination of social pressure and the desire from capitalists for a solution that
would stop the impending crisis, along with positive business responses to previous attempts at
labor legislation like the NIRA created an opportunity for politicians (68). A trend of post-facto
business support had developed, first with workmen’s compensation then with state-level
wage and hour regulation (71). For example, fierce competition in the textile industry had led
many firms to desire some type of federal wage and hour regulation to even out the market
(73). Though Southern textile firms had anxieties that this would give the competitive
advantage to firms in the North, they still favored some regulation as long as it could be locally
implemented according to their preferences (73).
When the time came to draft the Wagner Act, some key allies who supported both the
Act and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) were the New York clothing industry, the
United Mine Workers (UMW) and the construction industry, due in part to their ties with
Senator Wagner (83). There were also indications of support for the Act from capital-intensive
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and mass production industries such as rubber, Weyerhaeuser and retail (84). Their support
rested on the idea that collective bargaining would improve wages and working conditions,
which in turn would stabilize both supply and demand (84). The positive signals sent from these
key industries were promising to politicians because they demonstrated the potential for
eventual cross-class support and acceptance of the Wagner Act (104). Swenson contends that
politicians would not have even attempted to pass the Wagner Act if they sensed a businesswide backlash in the future and eventual defeat like they had encountered with the NIRA (82).
Swenson’s argument provides a more nuanced way to evaluate the capacity and
decision-making behavior of politicians. He cautions against looking at politicians as actors who
only seek to increase their power through increasing the capacity of the state (88). He also
cautions against looking at capitalists as having direct instrumental influence in the political
process (103). What is missing from these theories, Swenson argues, is the evaluation of
politicians and institution builders as “the real instrumental agents . . . [who rarely] choose to
act as if they can operate with much autonomy from the market interests in which durable and
robust policy must be anchored” (105). In this sense, Swenson’s theory allows politicians the
autonomy they deserve but also accepts how their choices are shaped and influenced by the
demands of capitalism.
Bill Winders develops a closer examination of cross-class alliances by looking at specific
class segments. Winders argues that for interest groups, the key to exerting influence is being a
part of the dominant political coalition (411). In this class-segment view, coalitions amongst
class segments and their relative political strength shift over time (411). The state serves as an
arbitrator between class segments who are competing to have their individual interests
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protected by the government in the face of strong competition (389). Class segments struggle
to increase their instrumental power by lobbying state legislators and becoming involved in
“administrative bureaucracies and the implementation of policies” as well as by building
coalitions with other segments that share common interests (390).
Winders explains that coalitions form for two distinct reasons: they are based on either
shared economic interests or shared political desires (390). Coalitions based on shared
economic interests are the most stable (390). During the New Deal, the dominant coalition
arose from an unlikely source. A new cross-class alliance primarily between northern labor and
southern planters had developed (392). To understand this complicated alliance, it will be
helpful to look at the strengths of each party involved.
After the electoral shift, most segments of capital with strong ties to the Republican
Party had lost power (393). In contrast, one major segment of capital benefitted from its strong
ties to the Democratic Party: the southern planters. They achieved strengthened instrumental
power, and their influence was seen in the major policies of the “Second New Deal” including
the Wagner Act (393). Winders notes that 68 percent of Southern Democrats supported the
Wagner Act (393). But their support was not unconditional; Southern planters had a strong
interest in both keeping their predominantly minority workforces repressed as well as
preventing wage increases and unionization that would come at the expense of profits in their
labor-dependent industry (393). The Southern planters demanded that the structure of their
political economy remain unchanged and in the case of the Wagner Act, that was provided
through exemptions that excluded the majority of their workforce (393).
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At the same time, labor was also gaining power. Widespread strikes were disrupting the
economy (393). The labor movement became more organized, due mostly in part to a
commitment to promoting the passage of the Wagner Act (393). And finally, the labor
movement had established itself as a valuable constituency. The unification of a large group of
voters who were now loyal to the Democratic Party strengthened the labor movement’s
political leverage (393).
The coalition between southern planters and northern labor was formed and based
primarily on a shared economic interest in state intervention in the economy (392). This shared
economic interest allowed the two groups to find common ground in their opinions on the
Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) and the Social Security Act (SSA) (392), but their alliance was
much more unstable in the case of the Wagner Act because it was much more political (409).
Winders finds evidence of the power of this class-segment coalition when looking at the
trajectory of the Wagner Act, compared with the AAA and SSA (395). The AAA and SSA
experienced more long-term success, whereas the implementation of the Wagner Act was
ridden with conflict (408). The Wagner Act strengthened labor and in turn this broke down the
coalition between southern planters and northern labor (409). The breakdown of this coalition
pushed southern planters into a new coalition with the rest of capital (409), and they launched
an assault on the Wagner Act that labor, now weakened and by itself, was unable to defend
(404).
Colin Gordon sees capital as being influential without the need for a cross-class alliance.
Because both labor and politics are disorganized, capitalists are able to achieve a special
political influence despite their own disorganization (“Why Wagner” 202). He explains that
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capitalists enjoy this privileged position due to the structure of the political economy (202).
American democracy is built around capitalism in that capitalism drives the economy and voters
and politicians “depend upon economic growth, business investment and business confidence”
(202). With the economy as political leverage, why was the Wagner Act able to be passed when
business opposition to it was so strong, as others have claimed?
Gordon argues that if business opposition to the Wagner Act was as strong as some
claim, it would have never been able to pass (New Deals 205). In reality, capitalists were
fragmented and only focused on their most immediate goal of earning profits (“Why Wagner”
203). Competition drove business interests to “scramble for competitive order and political
advantage,” although their attempts at this were “shortsighted and often dysfunctional” (203).
When it came to political power, capitalists aimed to influence policy in directions that would
benefit their respective industries. They knew that between the economic crisis, the failure of
the NRA, and the political dominance of the Democrats, some type of labor legislation was
inevitable (New Deals 205).
Though many capitalists undoubtedly took an official position of opposition to the
Wagner Act, they had difficulty articulating why in a reasonable way (219). Nor did they offer
any viable alternatives (219). In fact, as they emphasized the successes of “independent”
company unions they actually contradicted the alleged threat that real unions posed (219).
While the official consensus of business seemed to be against labor reform, some
segments of capital may have perceived at least some utility from labor law. Wagner contends
that “labor capitalists” in the coal, clothing, textile, glass, pottery, trucking, construction and
mass-production industries were open to federal labor legislation because they believed it
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would bring “industrial peace and manageable bargaining” (New Deals 211). These industries
had their own various reasons to support the idea of labor reform. For mass-production
industries, increasing unionization seemed imminent. A “federal framework” for collective
bargaining seemed much less threatening than the rise of radical or craft unions (211).
Industrial unionism would make it easier to regulate labor costs without much sacrifice on the
part of managers (215). Consumer-goods firms hoped to reap the benefits from workers
obtaining more disposable income (215). And even some labor-intensive firms reasoned they
could withstand wage increases, so long as all of their competitors were forced to do so as well
(215).
Ultimately, Gordon argues that the Wagner Act passed “without a clear purpose or
constituency” (New Deals 223). Business was divided, had become desperate to achieve some
kind of order after the Depression, and within the constraints of the crisis federal labor
legislation seemed potentially better than the narrow range of alternatives (224). At the same
time, the labor movement posed a threat to managerial rights and production, and since it had
grown as a result of the NIRA it forced politicians to become responsive (213). In the face of the
defeat of the NIRA, President Roosevelt was also eager to preserve as much of the NLRB as he
could without further impinging on the commerce clause (221). Since the commerce clause did
not apply to unions, the Wagner Act began to look like an attractive way to legally organize
labor policy and build on the NIRA’s goal of restoring economic order (221-2). And so the
Wagner Act was passed, without the widespread support of business, but also without a clear
and organized fight against it.
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As it has been shown, generalizations regarding the position of capital should be
avoided. There were numerous divisions within capital, as different segments had different
goals based on their business needs. These competing segments employed different strategies
to make their influence known. Some worked to directly influence politics through their
financial contributions as Ferguson pointed out. Others relied on their indirect responsibility for
the proper functioning of the economy, as Swenson and Gordon alluded to. And as Winders
explained, some segments even entered into an alliance with labor to strengthen their
influence. Business interests certainly played a major role in the passage of the Wagner Act,
whether by their action or lack thereof.

CONCLUSION- LABOR LAW FOR WHOM?
Nearly everyone in America held a stake in the passage of the Wagner Act. Politicians, workers,
and business elites all had individual opinions on the need for labor reform as well as what it
should look like. Both the way the Wagner Act was designed as well as the unintended side
effects it had after implementation make the question of what it was designed to do very
complicated. In order to attempt to understand the answer, one must thoroughly examine
various viewpoints such as the ones this essay has provided.
The ways in which various scholars understand the passage of the Wagner Act depends
on their underlying ideology which shapes their interpretation of historical events. As shown in
the Skocpol, Finegold and Goldfield exchanges the timing of strikes and whether they were
increasing or decreasing in number shaped their interpretations of whether the strikes were
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responsible for the political response or whether the autonomous reform efforts of politicians
led to the strikes.
While it is true that politicians are the ones ultimately responsible for drafting the
legislation that governs this country, it is also true that the structure of the United States
government was designed specifically to allow as many groups as possible the ability to have a
voice and participate in politics. Theories that focus on the autonomy of the state can miss the
enrichment that historical and societal perspectives can provide. It is important to recognize
that labor, business, and politics are very much intertwined.
A synthesis of the information provided in this essay can shed light on the
interconnections between different interest groups. The escalating struggle between
employees and employers in the early 1930s created a need for the government to take action.
When the NIRA was introduced, it politicized the struggle between labor and capital. With the
government now officially involved as a mediator, these groups began to think about what they
expected from the government.
Because the NIRA failed to meet the newly formed expectations of labor and capital as
well as the expectations of politicians, the government could not easily abandon its new role
and was forced to come up with a fresh solution. In a sense, the Wagner Act was created for all
three of these groups. While it may have been against the wishes of most capitalists, it was
designed with the hope that by allowing collective bargaining it would reduce work stoppages
and stabilize the market, which in turn would benefit business. Another intention was to build
up the strength of workers which would increase their potential as a political constituency as
well as allow them to stand on more equal footing with their employers. As the welfare of
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workers improved, they would be able to increase their consumption, which was good for both
business and the economy. A healthier economy would increase voter confidence in and loyalty
to the Democratic Party which benefitted the politicians in office. And a strong Democratic
Party could more easily garner support for future policy goals.
In the spirit of experimentation that was pervasive during the New Deal, political
reformers designed the Wagner Act using their best judgment and without fully knowing the
way it would work in process. Divisions within capital, between capital and labor, and even
within the Democratic Party were skillfully overcome. The complexity of the process through
which this occurred illustrates the difficulty of policy-making and highlights important behaviors
interest groups partake in when attempting to influence political outcomes.
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